The just published Oxford Handbook of Developmental and Life Course Criminology includes an article where John Laub, Zachary Rowan and Robert Sampson gives an update on the age-graded theory of informal social control, which has dominated the field of life course criminology for the past couple of decades.
A key proposition of the theory is that life-course transitions can represent turning points in a criminal career, and marriage is the transition that has received the most attention in the empirical literature. A few years ago, I wrote a critical review together with my colleagues, Jukka Savolainen, Kjersti Aase and Torkild Lyngstad. In their book chapter, Laub et al are clearly critical of our review. I am a bit flattered that they bothered criticising us, but I do have a few comments.
First, Laub et al. correctly point out that we are unsatisfied with the existing studies considering estimating causal effects, and they do not really contradict our claim. Nevertheless, they point out that we “do not offer a viable alternative to build on this existing knowledge” (p 302). That might be right, but I do not think that is our responsibility either. I think those who advocate for a theory also has the responsibility for providing convincing empirical evidence.
Second, I think we actually did suggest a viable alternative. Importantly, we doubt that a causal effect of marriage on crime can be estimated at all, since it is hard to see how there might be any plausible exogenous variation. (I do not rule that out completely, but I am still waiting to see such a study). Instead, we suggest checking the preconditions for the theory to be true. For example, one suggested mechanism is that the spouse oppose criminal behaviour and exercises social control. If so, a survey of spouses’ attitudes to offending and how they react to their husband’s behaviour would provide relevant empirical evidence to the extent the premises for the theory are true. Providing any such evidence would make the theory more plausible. (If the spouses are favourable to crime and/or do not excertise any meaningful control over their husband, then that mechanism is not supported. Otherwise, it is corroborated). So, a viable alternative would be to check more carefully the preconditions empirically. It would still not provide an estimate of a causal effect, that is true, but it might be the best we can do.
Third, Laub, Zachry and Sampson states that “to rule out evidence that only comes from non-randomized experiments is to rule out most of criminology” (p 302). Now, that does not quite follow from our argument. Estimates of causal effects can only be provided if there is some kind of exogenous variation to be exploited. A causal theory can be corroborated in other ways, but it is not easy either. A careful descriptive study might provide evidence that are inconsistent with competing theories. Empirical findings that are equally consistent with a selection effect (or other competing theories), does not really count as a test of the theory.
Fourth, they refer to my joint work with Jukka Savolainen where we show that change occurs prior to employment rather than as a response to it, which Torkild Lyngstad and I also showed regarding the transition to marriage. Laub et al point out that Laub and Sampson (2003) acknowledge that ‘turning points’ are a part of a gradual process, and that turning points “are not a constant once set in motion, and they vary through time” (p 307). While this might sound reasonable, it also makes it a bit hard to understand what a turning point is. If changes in offending before marriage (or work) are consistent with the theory, then I am not sure it is possible to say when a turning point occurs. That makes it harder to empirically test the theory.
Fifth, Laub et al hint that since almost only studies using Norwegian register data shows the pattern of decline prior to a turning point, it might be something particular with the Norwegian setting. We actually suggested that the family formation patterns in the Nordic countries differ from the US in our review of research (see our article, page 438). While the context might indeed be important, that is not the main reason why so few other studies have found the same pattern. Actually, we argue that our findings are consistent with previously published results. Earlier studies should be repeated using an approach similar to what we did: just check the timing of change in offending relative to the transition in question. Until that is done, there is no basis for claiming the Norwegian patterns are any different from other contexts. (They might be, but we do not know yet).
Sixth, Laub et al discuss the role of cohabitation, and make a similar argument as we did in our review article: that the role of cohabitation is often a ‘trial-period’ or a ‘stepping stone’ towards marriage, and if it works out they will often marry. But Laub et al’s discussion of evidence focuses on whether the marriage effect translates into cohabiting couples, which is a discussion that does not take into account the point that marriage is an increasingly selective state, as well as it is becoming increasingly difficult to say when we should expect to see changes in offending.
In sum, I do apprechiate Laub et al. making an effort discussing specific arguments in our work. However, I am not quite convinced. I actually tend to think a romantic partner, a good job and generally changes in life situation might have an effect on crime. I find that reasonable, and I hope it is true. I am nevertheless not quite convinced by the empirical evidence, and I am hesitant to make claims about ‘turning points’. However, I do believe the empirical evidence can be improved through: 1) Check the timing of change, and 2) empirically investigate the specific preconditions for the mechanisms at work.